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WINDFALLS, WIPEOUTS, AND NUISANCE
LAW: STRICT LIABILITY WITH OR
WITHOUT RESTRICTED DAMAGES*
DENNIS R. HONABA CH* *
In Windfallsfor W6peouts' (WF), authors Hagman and Misczyn-
ski address the issue of recapturing the benefits and compensating the
losses to landowners that flow from certain public and private activi-
ties. The authors' principal analysis consists of a proposal for the
enactment of a windfalls for wipeouts plan. This scheme, in either its
omnibus format or controls format,2 provides for the recapture of
benefits through taxation and the compensation of loss through direct
payment. Hagman and Misczynski's text also includes, however, a
discussion of existing windfall recapture and wipeout mitigation de-
vices. In chapters 8 and 9, for example, Davis D. Thompson evalu-
ates the role nuisance law plays as a wipeout mitigation device.
* This is the first of two articles in this volume examining the windfall for
wipeouts issue in the context of the book by Hagman and Misczynski (see note I
infra). The second article, by Dr. Richard 0. Brooks, follows this article by Professor
Honabach.
** Associate Professor of Law, Vermont Law School. A.B., Bucknell University,
1970; J.D., Yale Law School, 1973.
1. D. HAGMAN & D. MISCZYNSKI, WINDFALLS FOR WIPEOuTs: LAND VALUE
CAPTURE AND COMPENSATION (1978) [hereinafter cited as WFW].
2. WFW. supra note I, at 31-71. The primary distinction between the omnibus
proposal and the controls proposal is that the former treats all windfalls and wipeouts
whatever the cause while the latter addresses only those caused by governmentally
instituted land use controls.
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Thompson concludes that current applications of nuisance law pro-
duce inefficient results and advocates the adoption of a "Strict Liabil-
ity with Restricted Damages" rule (SL/RD) to make nuisance law
more efficient. Acceptance of Thompson's SL/RD approach would
require courts to abandon the present "best-user" approach charac-
teristic of American nuisance law and eschew the traditional measure
of compensatory damages.
Thompson presents his analysis in a manner which is only superfi-
cially attractive. On a first reading, Thompson's analysis does seem
to "work"; SL/RD appears to maximize total welfare. Thompson's
analysis, however, ignores the buzz of Meade's storied bees.3 The
ever present problem of externalities4 casts considerable doubt on the
otherwise persuasive quality of Thompson's analysis. The value of
beneficial externalities, although a product of an individual's land
use decision, can neither be captured by the individual nor reflected
in the individual's calculus of the impact of his or her action. Other
analysis by Thompson raises additional unanswered questions.
The issue addressed here is not whether Thompson's analysis will
ultimately prove sound. Rather, this Article proposes that Thomp-
son's analysis provides inadequate support for his conclusion. The
points made are neither new nor startling to individuals familiar with
welfare economics. The points merit repetition, however, because
WFW's audience will undoubtedly include many who are unfamiliar
with economic analysis and who are otherwise apt to find Thomp-
son's analysis, or that in favor of other strict liability proposals, con-
vincing.
The relationship of nuisance law, whatever its precise parameters,
to Hagman and Misczynski's proposed omnibus scheme, raises a sub-
sidiary issue. The incorporation of nuisance law into the windfall for
wipeout proposals poses issues that deserve emphasis. Given the
magnitude of Hagman's and Misczynski's undertaking, however,
readers should not be surprised to find some slippage in the incorpo-
3. See Johnson, Meade, Bees, andExternalities, 16 J. LAW & ECON. 35 (1973). See
also Gould, Meade on Externalities.- Should the Beneicaries be Taxed?, 16 J. LAW
AND ECON. 53 (1973).
4. An externality is the amount by which social cost diverges from private cost.
See Dahlman, The Problem ofExternality, 22 J. LAW & ECON. 141 (1979). Externali-
ties result because of the presence of transaction costs. See Coase, The Problem of
Social Cost, 3 J. LAW & ECON. 1 (1960). See also Calabresi, Transaction Costs, Re-
source Allocations and Liability Rules: A Comment, 11 J. LAW & EcON. 67, 68 n.5
(1966).
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ration of in-place mitigation schemes into the author's omnibus pro-
posal. The proposed incorporation is, nevertheless, somewhat odd
and deserves discussion.
I. STRICT LIABILITY WITH RESTRICTED DAMAGES-THE
PROPOSAL
Thompson's general proposition posits that American nuisance law
does not ensure the "best" use of land. He proposes a strict liability
with restricted damages (SL/RD) rule as an alternative to the present
balancing system, or "best user" rule.' The major difference between
a strict liability system (regardless of how damages are measured)
and a best user system is that the former divests the decision maker of
much of the discretion inherent in the best user approach. Once a
court determines that a particular invasion is of the category that
constitutes a nuisance, its only remaining duty is to calculate the
damages caused by that invasion. The court need not consider the
desirability of either the nuisance creating activity or the victim's
land use. In theory, the nuisance maker, not the court, determines
5 WFW, supra note 1, at 194-95. Thompson's characterization of American nui-
sance law as best user is accurate as a generalization. Most nuisance actions are based
on either an intentional tort or a negligence theory. To be actionable under the inten-
tional tort theory, defendant's action must be both intentional and unreasonable. RE-
STATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 822 (1979). Roughly speaking, conduct is
unreasonable or negligent only when the gravity of the harm outweighs the utility of
the conduct. Id § 8. See W. PROSSER, THE LAW OF TORTS § 89 (4th ed. 1971) [here-
inafter cited as PROSSER]. Since the essence of a nuisance action is a conflict between
land uses, a decision for either party is a decision that the victorious party is the
"better or best" user of the land.
There are hints that American courts are moving away from "best user" towards a
strict liability approach. In Boomer v. Atlantic Cement Co., 26 N.Y.2d 219, 257
N E 2d 870, 309 N.Y.S.2d 312 (1970), the court permitted defendant to continue to
operate so long as it was willing to pay damages determined by the court. While the
precise basis of the opinion is unclear, it is arguable that Boomer reflects the policy of
§ 829A of the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS (1979), which provides for recovery
of damages by plaintiff if the harm he suffers is "severe and greater than the plaintiff
should be required to bear without compensation." See "James-Keeton Proposals,"
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, Explanatory Notes § 822 (Tent. Draft No. 17,
1971) for a discussion of the policy of § 829A. Judicial acceptance of Boomer and
§ 829A has not been rapid. however, and "best user" still appears to be the dominant
approach of American courts.
Thompson somewhat incorrectly describes "best user" as assigning the right to use
property "to the party who values it most highly." WFW, supra note 1, at 188. In
fact, under the best user approach, the court assigns the right to the party whom it
believes "ought" to value it most highly. The essence of "best user" is that the court,
not the parties, is the decision maker.
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whether the continued use of the property in the offensive manner is
worthwhile. A market determination is substituted for a judicial de-
cision.
In addition to proposing a shift from "best user" to a strict liability
theory, Thompson proposes a reformulation of the method of mea-
suring plaintiffs damages. Rejecting the traditional measure of dam-
ages as the difference in the value of plaintiffs land and buildings
with and without the nuisance,6 Thompson suggests that plaintiffs
recovery be limited solely to the decline in the value of his land.7
Defendant's liability, however, would continue to be measured by the
court as the total decline in the value of plaintiff's land and buildings.
The difference between the amount for which defendant would be
liable (the decline in value of plaintiffs property) and the amount to
be recovered by plaintiff (the decline in value to his land) would ac-
crue to the government.8 Although Thompson never provides a pre-
cise definition of "land," he apparently means only raw land.9 The
central thesis underlying his proposal to modify the measure of re-
covery is that so limited, nuisance law would encourage the plaintiff
to make the most efficient use of his land in light of the limitation. So
long as plaintiff devotes the use of his land to its best use, Thompson
posits, the entire decline in the market value of his property will rep-
resent a decline in land value.' 0 If a plaintiff inefficiently uses his
land, the decline in value caused by defendant's action will reflect
diminished value to both plaintiffs land and his buildings.
Thompson's major contribution to nuisance literature is his propo-
sal for restricted damages." Other commentators have advocated
strict liability as the appropriate theory of liability.'2 Nevertheless,
6. PROSSER, supra note 5, § 90.
7. WFW, supra note 1, at 194-95.
8. Id at 195, 201.
9. In describing restricted damages, Thompson states that the defendant pays for
damages to B's land and buildings,but B only recovers for the reduction in value to
his land. Thompson discusses the value of the "land undeveloped." WFW, Mpra
note 1, at 195. He thus seems to be speaking in classic Georgist terms. See WFW,
supra note 1, at 33.
10. WFW, supra note 1, at 195.
11. Thompson had earlier made the same point. See Thompson, Land Use,4lo-
cation and the Problem of Wyieouts from Private and Government Land Use." A Sug-
gested Rule, 6 ENVT'L L. REv. 431 (1975).
12. See Ellickson, Alternatives to Zoning: Covenants, Nuisance Rules and Fines as
Land Use Controls, 40 U. CH. L. REv. 681 (1973); Epstein, Nuisance Law: Corrective
Justice andIts Utilitarian Constraints, 8 J. LEGAL STUD. 49 (1979). Nuisance law has
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the major portion of Thompson's work in WFWis his defense of the
proposition that strict liability is superior to a "best user" approach.
II. THE EVALUATION SCHEME
To support his call for a SL/RD system of nuisance law, Thomp-
son adopts the evaluative scheme popularized by Michelman.
Thompson states that "the general purpose of nuisance law ... is to
see to it that goods are produced efficiently and distributed fairly."' 3
He then defines an efficient nuisance policy as one in which the vari-
ous costs associated with nuisances, evaluated in dollars, are mini-
mized. 14 The law is efficient, in other words, if it effects a result from
which there is no change creating a potential Pareto improvement.' 5
In insisting upon a "monetizable" measure of costs, Thompson de-
parts from the general pattern of recent nuisance law analysis.
Michelman, for example, defines an efficient policy as one "which
maximizes the total amount of welfare, of personal satisfaction, in
society, and not all satisfaction is material."'6 Calabresi and Me-
lamed, like Thompson, define efficiency as minimizing costs. They
define "'costs," however, to include all disutilities includng those
which are not monetary or even "monetizable" in some rough
sense.' 7 Thompson limits his definition to monetizable costs, but of-
fers no real explanation other than to suggest that the restricted defi-
nition is traditional in nuisance literature. 18 Economic analysis of
generated a considerable wealth of recent thoughtful literature. See, e.g., Calabresi &
Melamed. Propert,' Rules, Liability Rules and Inalienability: One View of the Cathe-
dral. 85 HARV. L. REv. 1089 (1972); Polinsky, Controlling Externalities andProtecting
Entitlements. Proper4v Rights, Liability Rules and Tax-Subsidy Approaches, 8 J. LE-
GAL STUD. 1 (1979), Rabin, Nuisance Law- Rethinking Fundamental Assumptions, 63
VA. L. REV. 1299 (1977); Note, Efficient Land Use and the Internalization of Benefcial
Spidovers: An Economic and Legal Analysis, 31 STAN. L. REv. 457 (1979).
13. WFW, supra note 1, at 184. Michelman popularized the notion of efficiency
and equity analysis in land use control. See Michelman, Property, Utility and Fair-
ness. Comments on the Ethical Foundation of "'Just Compensation" Law, 80 HARV. L.
REV. 1165 (1967).
14. WFW, supra note 1, at 185.
15. A potential Pareto improvement is an economic rearrangement in which gains
can be so distributed as to make everyone in the community better off. See E.
MISHAN, COST-BENEFIT ANALYSIS 132, 316-17 (1976). See also Calabresi & Me-
lamed, supra note 12, at 1094.
16. Michelman, supra note 13, at 1173. (Emphasis added)
17. Calabresi & Melamed, supra note 12, at 1094 n. 11.
18. WFW, supra note 1, at 185.
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nuisance law is, however, hardly traditional. Thompson refers to
Misczynski's comments on Efficiency and Equity'9 elsewhere in
WFW but they offer little support for his position.2" Misczynski's
justification for using market-derived values is largely pragmatic. He
accepts market-established values because they can be measured
while "there is no way to go out and measure welfare."'"
Of course, it is not necessarily intellectually dishonest to proffer a
definition primarily for pragmatic reasons; such an approach is con-
venient. The difficulty is that the definition simply does not fit.
Thompson himself notes that the definition "has the considerable dis-
advantage of assuming that [costs] are properly weighed by their
market value in dollars., 2' Thompson's determination that a system
is efficient is correct, in other words, only to the extent that no
nonmonetizable costs exist and to the extent that those costs which
have monetary values have been accurately valued. Neither proposi-
tion is ever true. The error is particularly glaring when a proposed
system depends upon encouraging an individual to make decisions
that reflect only market valuation.
Thompson categorizes costs along the general lines suggested by
Ellickson and Michelman.23 He suggests that the costs of a nuisance
include nuisance costs,2 4 prevention costs,25 administrative costs, 26
and demoralization costs.2 7 Thompson notes that administrative
costs include negotiation costs and litigation costs. 28 He divides de-
moralization costs into demoralization costs and risk costs.29 Finally,
19. Id
20. Id
21. Id at 145.
22. Id at 185. As Calabresi and Melamed note, one problem with insisting on a
monetary valuation is that some matters are never entered into the calculation. But
see Fischel, Windfalls for Wipeouts in a Coasion Property Rights Perspection, (Au-
gust, 1979) (paper presented at Windfalls for Wipeouts Conference at Vermont Law
School), in which Fischel argues that all things have a monetary value.
23. See Ellickson, supra note 12, at 688-89; Michelman, supra note 13, at 1214.
24. WFW, supra note 1, at 185.
25. Id Thompson subdivides prevention costs into prevention (physical cost, or
out-of-pocket) costs and opportunity costs. The distinction is often significant to pre-
vent opportunity costs from being ignored. For our purposes, however, the two can
be lumped together.
26. Id at 186.
27. Id
28. Id
29. Id
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Thompson introduces the concept of "misallocation costs." Misallo-
cation costs occur "when the sum of nuisance and prevention costs
which would occur under a given assignment of rights is greater than
the sum which would occur if administrative costs were zero."3°
Thompson's definition of damages requires comment. He assumes
damages equal the lesser of nuisance costs and prevention costs,3 '
thus incorporating the doctrine of avoidable consequences. 32 For ex-
ample, if a smoke belching factory causes a $75,000 house to be unin-
habitable unless a $5,000 air filtration system is installed, Thompson
would value the damages to the house at $5,000, not $75,000. This
issue might be moot, however, if a court computes the damages as the
difference between the market value of plaintiffs land with and with-
out the nuisance; the market probably will reflect the presence of pre-
vention costs as a floor to market value diminution.33 A court might
also, however, take into account peculiarities of the plaintiff, such as
inability to tolerate the side effects of the most efficient preventive
measure, e.g., if the owner of the $75,000 house could not tolerate the
filtered air unless it were further treated at the cost of an additional
$20,000. If it did so, plaintif's recovery might exceed the otherwise
market-determined decline in value. The extent to which courts are
willing to tolerate a plaintiffs special needs or preferences is not
clear.
Thompson also ignores the distinction between market value and
personal value suggested by Ellickson 34 as being too difficult to meas-
ure and somewhat insignificant.35 He further assumes that the
amount A would be required to pay B to buy a right from B to pol-
lute is the same as B would pay to have A cease polluting if he were
otherwise entitled to pollute.36 The identity of these amounts may be
30. Id at 188.
31. Id at 191.
32. For example, the rose garden in Section IV infra.
33. There appears to be some doubt about whether the doctrine of avoidable con-
sequences applies to nuisance law. Compare PROSSER, supra note 5, at 391, with
WOOD ON NUISANCES (5th ed. 1875). As discussed in the text, the issue becomes
moot if the courts use decline in market value as the measure of damages.
34 Ellickson, supra note 12, at 735-37. Ellickson has suggested that plaintiff be
entitled to recover an additional amount of damage in addition to market decline to
compensate him for the loss of his homestead and the disorientation and discomfort
he would suffer in changing his life style.
35. WFW, supra note I, at 191-92.
36. Id
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assumed only if A's and B's values are wealth indifferent. Mishan
suggests that such is not the case.37 If Mishan is correct, Thompson
errs in failing to recognize that what is Pareto-optimal would vary
depending upon the allocative effects of the various liability rules he
uses.
Thompson's evaluative scheme virtually ignores the issue of fair-
ness. Unlike his attempt to define efficiency, he offers no concrete
definition of fairness. Fairness, he states, is an ill-defined concept.38
Undeniably, he is correct. The inability to define fairness does not,
however, diminish its importance. Yet, that inability tempts one to
ignore it. Thompson does so, stating: "It is without question that
fairness is and ought to be an important goal of nuisance law. But we
have little to recommend as an objective guide for determining the
fairness of suggested revisions of that law."39 The concept of fairness
plays virtually no further role in Thompson's evaluation. He concen-
trates solely on developing and applying efficiency criteria. Unfortu-
nately, Thompson's approach runs afoul of Misczynski's
admonishment in WFW that economic analysis often shortchanges
discussions of equity (fairness) because economists have useful obser-
vations about efficiency but only opinions about equity.4" As Mis-
czynski, and probably Thompson recognizes, the danger is "that
equity and efficiency strategies may become inextricably interlocked,
and a policy which simultaneously deals with both of them may be
required."'"
Efficiency is dependent upon a given distribution of wealth. By
ignoring fairness Thompson assumes a given distribution. Yet nui-
sance law appears to have often functioned as a vehicle for redistrib-
uting wealth.42 For example, a decision that recognizes a right to be
37. See MISHAN, COST BENEFIT ANALYSIS, supra note 15, at 132-34. See also R.
POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW, 35 n. I (2d ed. 1977); Calabresi & Melamed,
supra note 12, at 1095. Unlike firms, individuals' preference curves, that is, the
amount they would pay for various goods, are variable and dependent upon wealth.
Therefore, if the initial assignment of entitlements makes individuals wealthier, they
may value the entitlement more or less highly than they would were they required to
buy it. The initial entitlement may thus serve to redefine the Pareto optimal point.
This phenomenon, sometimes termed "wealth elasticity," is a significant check on the
Coase theorem. See Coase, supra note 4.
38. WFW, supra note 1, at 184.
39. Id at 185.
40. Id at 142.
41. Id at 143.
42. The demand for the recognition of aesthetic nuisances is to some extent
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free from a type of invasion previously permissible serves to make
plaintiff and others like him richer. Conversely, defendant and
others in the same situation become poorer. Although such a deci-
sion might arguably be the "efficient" result in the long run, it re-
mains true that for reasons other than efficiency one group has been
favored at the expense of another by affording that group a right it
could not or might not have cared to purchase.
That nuisance law may act as a device to permit courts to redistrib-
ute wealth may be objectionable to some, particularly those perceiv-
ing the proper role of law to be solely that of removing barriers that
stifle the operation of the market, does not justify ignoring that role.
Thompson's failure to consider the equity issue is especially dis-
turbing in that he silently undercuts the equity power of the court by
advocating adoption of strict liability. Perhaps courts make poor be-
nevolent dictators and ought to be stripped of that power, but advo-
cates of systems that would do so have a duty to address the equity
issue. Since Thompson fails to make the argument in terms of the
efficiency criteria he considers, analysis of the relative merits of vari-
ous systems on equity grounds is unnecessary. Should Thompson
prove correct in his theory that SL/RD is more efficient than "best
user." one must determine whether the loss of the court's equity
power is a loss worth bearing.
III. STRICT LIABILITY WITH RESTRICTED DAMAGES-
PRELIMINARY COMMENTS
After applying various liability/remedy combinations to a series of
hypothetical cases, 43 Thompson concludes that the best single ap-
designed solely as a device for internalization of unsightly diseconomies. It will, how-
ever, also have a redistributive effect upon wealth which may or may not be intended.
See generaly Note, Aesthetic Nuisance: An Emerging Cause of Action, 45 N.Y.U. L.
REV 1075 (1970). Certainly anyone who advocates that right must recognize that
among those who are most likely to be directly affected are the employees of plants
that are deemed to be aesthetically unappealing.
43 Thompson's methodology is to compare the efficiency of various liabil-
ity/remedy combinations in three hypothetical cases. The combinations used are best
user/injunction, best user/damages, strict liability/injunction, strict liabil-
ity/damages, no liability/inverse damages, strict liability/damages/contributory neg-
ligence, and strict liability/restricted damages. Case 1, the simple case, is the classic
smoke spewing factory/affected residence case. Difficult Case I is the situation con-
fronting the landowners in the simple case before either had built. Difficult Case II,
the "'Making the Nuisance Go Away" case, involves the situation in which the fac-
tory, built at a time when it represented the efficient use, becomes inefficient.
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proach to nuisance law is to adopt a strict liability with restrictive
damages rule (SL/RD). Thompson suggests five reasons for adopt-
ing SL/RD:
1) a defendant, being liable for the full measure of damages,
must determine the utility of his use;
2) a plaintiff, being limited to recovery of decreases in land
value, will attempt to use his property for its most efficient use;
3) administrative costs are minimized because there is less un-
certainty about the result of litigation, thereby facilitating nego-
tiations. In addition, should litigation be necessary, the court's
role is limited to determining the extent of defendant's liability
and the amount of plaintiffs recovery;
4) risk costs are reduced because the threat of certain wipeouts
would be eliminated; and,
5) demoralization costs are decreased because entitlements
would be clearly stated.44
To clarify the parties' respective rights, Thompson rejects Ellick-
son's attempts45 to attach strict liability to certain uses. Instead, he
assigns strict liability for certain types of physical invasions.46 He
considers any general "aesthetic right" to be undefinable but permits
the courts to create exceptions for certain designated uses such as fu-
neral parlors, cemeteries, and nuclear plants.47 Thompson's belief
Throughout the analysis, Thompson posits the efficient result which does not vary
despite variations in entitlements. He initially assumes that administration costs are
zero but relaxes that assumption as he develops his argument. WFW, supra note 1, at
189-96.
44. Id at 199.
45. Ellickson, supra note 12, at 728-33.
46. WFW, supra note 1, at 196-201.
47. WFW, supra note 1, at 200. The reader should note the irony of Thompson's
decision. Although purporting to adopt a strict liability system (such as a system in
which the market determines outcomes) Thompson is compelled to make the grandest
choice of all. He must decide what is or is not a nuisance. This choice is necessary
since the market cannot answer what Calabresi refers to as the "what is a cost of
what" question. G. CALABRESI, THE COST OF ACCIDENTS 133-34 (1970). Were that
question not answered, there would be a plethora of nuisance actions in which plain-
tiffs could argue that they had suffered damage by foregoing using their property in a
way we commonly think of as a nuisance. For a discussion of the reciprocal nature of
damages, see Coase, supra note 4, at 2. In arriving at his categorical definition of
"nuisance," Thompson may be showing his true motive. He is more concerned with
who makes the crucial decision (the courts or him) than how that decision is imple-
mented. Of course, the market cannot function unless initial entitlements are decided.
It is ironic that those who argue for strict liability and decision making by the imper-
sonal market must ultimately make (or accept choices made by others) the most cru-
cial decision of all-whose position is to be the valued one?
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that SL/RD will give useful market information to both plaintiffs
and defendants may ultimately prove to be the weak link in his anal-
ysis. His remaining reasons for preferring SL/RD, however, raise
three distinct concerns.
A. Administrative Costs
Thompson's assumption that the administrative costs associated
with administering a SL/RD system would be lower than administer-
ing other systems48 is unsupported. In a strict liability system the
determination of what is a nuisance is generally easier than in a bal-
ancing system like the "best user," although so long as courts are
permitted to create exceptions for particular uses, the definition can
never be certain. It is unclear, however, whether uncertainty about
the definition of "nuisance" deters or encourages claims. One might
speculate that uncertainty, by increasing litigation expenses, deters
small claims and encourages larger ones. Strict liability, by clarifying
the definition, might therefore encourage the prosecution of small
claims and discourage larger claims. That result, however, is far
from clear and might well be erroneous depending upon the identity
of the claimant, his relevant economic position, his beliefs and even
the deductibility of his litigation expenses.49 Though Thompson
notes that ordinary strict liability might be more expensive than "best
user," 50 he never addresses the issue.
Thompson implies, however, that restricted damages tip the bal-
ance decidedly towards strict liability. Given SL/RD, a court need
not determine whether a plaintiff was "contributorily negligent," a
step which Thompson believes is otherwise necessary in a strict liabil-
ity system to assure efficient results.5 ' Furthermore, Thompson as-
serts that the additional step of determining plaintiffs recovery is less
expensive than determining contributory negligence.52 Assuming
that Thompson is correct, he has proven only that SL/RD is less ex-
48. WFW, supra note 1, at 198.
49. An individual's decision to litigate is highly dependent upon such matters as
his risk tolerance, the deductability of litigation expenses, the ability to obtain neces-
sary data (or to conceal it) and the relative resources of his opponent. The decision to
litigate, for example, might represent a decision that litigation is the least expensive
way to delay. See generallyR. POSNER, supra note 37, at 434-41.
50. WFW, supra note 1, at 198.
5. Id at 194. Thompson uses "contributory negligence" in a Posnerian sense.
See Posner, Strict Liability: A Comment, 2 J. LEGAL STUD. 205, 207 (1973).
52. WFW, supra note I, at 198.
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pensive than strict liability with contributory negligence (SL/CN); he
never addresses the question of whether SL/RD is cheaper than the
best user rule. Consideration of that issue is left to the reader.
Surprisingly, Thompson never addresses two elements of adminis-
tration costs peculiar to his SL/RD system. First, he fails to consider
the difficulty of determining the amount of damages plaintiff receives
or the measure of restricted damages. Any measure of damages here
must begin with the value of the plaintiffs land. Thompson, how-
ever, never defines land. Presumably, he means only raw land.5 3 He
suggests that determining plaintiffs site value would not be easy but
gives no indication of how difficult it might be. Hagman and Mis-
czynski, on the other hand, indicate elsewhere in WFW that site val-
uation is quite costly and administratively difficult.5 4 Some
commentators even suggest that measuring site value is infeasible in a
theoretical, as well as practical, sense.55
Secondly, Thompson tends to ignore the costs that individuals
would incur to determine the effective use of their respective lands.
He recognizes that "in the real world determining the efficient use of
property is a very difficult and costly task."56 Yet in his discussion of
administrative costs, he considers only the costs of resolving disputes;
he ignores the information gathering costs imposed on parties decid-
ing how to act.57 On this point, Thompson acts more as an advocate
than an analyst.
B. Risk Costs
Thompson states that strict liability might be expected to reduce
risk costs by limiting the number of instances in which plaintiff is
totally wiped out. He contends that risk reduction is socially desira-
ble, relying "on the widely accepted assumption that individuals are
risk adverse.""8 In so contending, Thompson falls victim to a fallacy
of composition-the assumption that what is true for the individual
53. See note 9 supra.
54. WFW, supra note 1, at 35.
55. See Oldman and Teachout, Some 4dministrative Aspects of Site Value Taxa-
tion: Defining Land and Value; Designing a Review Process, in TAXATION OF URBAN
PROPERTY IN LESS DEVELOPED COUNTRIES 207 (R. Bahl ed. 1979). SeegenerallyTHE
ASSESSMENT OF LAND VALUE (D. Holland ed. 1970).
56. WFW, supra note 1, at 193.
57. Id at 197-98.
58. Id at 198.
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or part is necessarily true for the group or whole. It might be that risk
and the potential benefit of undertaking it is a vital component of the
macroeconomy. Society might benefit more from encouraging risk
takers to act than from reducing risks. The reduction in risk costs
associated with strict liability is not clearly a desirable result in the
macroeconomic sense. Any contention that it is needs more support
than an illogical generalization of the experience of the individual.
C. Demoralization Costs
Thompson concludes that strict liability is likely to reduce demor-
alization costs because it creates "clearly assigned rights which the
members of society can understand and learn to expect."59 Individu-
als would thus experience fewer frustrations of their expectations.
Best user, on the other hand, relies on individualized balancing to
determine "reasonableness" and, therefore, does not produce results
as predictable as those under strict liability.
Thompson confuses predictability with fairness. His assumption
that clearly assigned rights shape expectations and thereby define
"equitable" is true only if society perceives those rights as naturally
ordained. If, on the other hand, society perceives law as a social tool,
the assignment of entitlements will coincide with expectations about
equity only so long as it appears to produce results consistent with
those expectations. History is replete with examples of clearly de-
fined rules which promoted revolution, not satisfaction. It is possible,
therefore, for strict rules to produce results which are frequently arbi-
trary or inconsistent with expectations and thus demoralizing.
"Best user," by emphasizing reasonableness, tends to appeal to
one's sense of fairness. Though "best user" also produces results in-
consistent with expectations, the results do not appear to be as arbi-
trary as strict liability results. Although not everyone will concur as
to what is "reasonable" in a given situation, everyone can agree that
"reasonableness" is an appropriate test. Results inconsistent with
one's expectations need not be recognized as evidence of bad law but
can be rationalized as evidence of poor judging or lawyering. More-
over, given that in any "reasonable" system presumptions, general-
izations and rules of thumb decide a great number of cases, it cannot
be assumed that the number of cases in which expectations are de-
nied is significantly greater in a best user system than under strict
59. Id at 199.
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liability.6" It is unclear, therefore, which system would produce
higher demoralization costs.
Additionally, Thompson's proposal does not call for adopting strict
liability in a vacuum, but for replacing the present system. A dy-
namic element is thus introduced. Nowhere does Thompson address
the vital question of whether the savings to be gained from his system
would adequately compensate for the demoralization costs associated
with both the changeover and the realization by affected people that
a system which has abruptly changed once may at some future date
do so again.
The problem of abrupt change and its attendant demoralization
costs raises yet another question about the validity of Thompson's
assumption that SL/RD reduces demoralization costs.6 ' Even if we
assume that the system is implemented and that clearly defined rights
are assigned, we must recognize that change will constantly occur and
will create pressure for recognition of new societal preferences. A
best user system permits recognition of that change in a way that does
not dramatically contradict existing rules. In fact, a major benefit of
a best user system is that it facilitates relatively painless recognition
of change.62 Strict liability draws hard lines. Departures, therefore,
tend to be more apparent. As one would expect, recognized changes
are more demoralizing than those which might be perceived as cor-
recting adjustments in one's expectations.
Whether implementation of SL/RD can be justified a.s reducing
demoralization costs is a far more complex subject than Thompson's
brief discussion suggests. He may well be correct in his conclusion.
His basis, however, is purely speculative.
In sum, Thompson advances SL/RD in part because it would
lessen administration costs, demoralization costs, and risk costs. He
does not adequately support his conclusions about the former two
costs. It is quite possible that SL/RD might increase both. Even if
one grants Thompson his point about risk costs, it is not clear
whether that reduction is socially desirable. Again, his argument is
60. See PROSSER, supra note 5, § 35 for a discussion of the common law courts'
attempts to formulate rules of law to govern negligence cases. For an illustration of
the difficulties of doing so, compare Baltimore & Ohio Ry. v. Goodman, 275 U.S. 66
(1927) with Pakora v. Wabash Ry., 292 U.S. 98 (1934).
61. See WFW, supra note 1, at 199.
62. See Bischoff, The Dynamics ofTort Law Court or Legislature?, 4 VERMONT
L. Rav. 35 (1979).
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unsupported. SL/RD may in fact be a "better" system, but before we
subject ourselves to the costs of overhauling our present system,
Thompson must provide clearer reasons.
IV. INTERNALIZING EXTERNALITIES
6 3
The main thrust of Thompson's SL/RD proposal is an attempt to
apply principles of strict liability to resolve land use disputes. The
basic premise of strict liability systems is that, if required to internal-
ize the harmful externalities created by his land use, an individual
acting in his own best interest effects an efficient result. Thus, assume
that A owns land which as a factory site has a value of $100,000.
Alternatively, A's land is worth $75,000 as a residential site. Based
on that data, A would build the factory site and capture the $25,000
excess. Assume, however, that the factory generated $30,000 in nui-
sance costs for which A would be liable in a strict liability situation.
What would A do? He would either develop his land as a residential
site or pay prevention costs if the prevention costs and administration
costs associated with their payment were less than $25,000. If the
nuisance costs consisted of smoke damage to B's rose garden and B
were willing to do without his garden for less than $25,000, A could
"buy out" the garden and develop a factory site. If the garden could
not be relocated, protected or purchased for less than $25,000, A
would develop a residential site.
Can it be said that any of the above results are efficient? No! The
basic assumption in the analysis is that the values assigned to A's
land and B's garden accurately reflect their social worth. The as-
sumption is only partially true. The $100,000 valuation assigned to
A's land if developed as a factory site represents the discounted value
of A's land for that use. That is, the present value of all rentals that
A would receive if he were to develop a factory site would be
$ 100,000. If, under a strict liability system, he were assigned liability
for the nuisance costs to B's garden, the present value of which is
$30,000, the value of A's land as a factory site would decline by the
lesser of nuisance costs or prevention costs plus administration costs.
Likewise, the value of B's land, were A entitled to operate his factory
with impunity, would decrease by the lesser of nuisance or preven-
tion costs plus administration costs. Thus the value of both A's and
63. See Note, Efficient Land Use and the Internalization of Beneficial SpiMovers:
An Economic and Legal Analysis, 31 STAN. L. REv. 457 (1979), for a recognition of
the problem of internalizing external benefits.
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B's lands depends upon the gross value of all benefits for which the
owner could charge less the value of all diseconomies for which he is
liable. Excluded from the calculus are the value of beneficial exter-
nalities generated by a land user but for which he cannot charge and
diseconomies for which he is not liable. Restated in
Hagman/Misczynski terminology, land values reflect externalities
only to the extent that their owners must pay for "wipeouts" and may
collect for "windfalls."
The significance of the exclusion of uncompensated wipeouts and
nonliability windfalls can be illustrated by returning to the hypotheti-
cal. Recall that if liable for the damage to B's garden, A would build
a house if prevention/administration costs exceeded $25,000. By do-
ing so he would maximize his wealth. Might not the factory, how-
ever, generate "windfalls" as well as "wipeouts?" The answer
intuitively is yes. Some benefits, of course, are captured. For exam-
ple, if A's building of a nearby factory is advantageous for those who
use its output, A could expect to extract some payment for that ad-
vantage. That externality would be recaptured in the form of higher
prices. The higher than normal profits increase the value of the land
as a plant site. In our hypothesis the $100,000 valuation would reflect
this result.
All beneficial externalities are not, however, recaptured. Those not
recaptured fall into two categories. One includes those economies
which would, in a purely competitive system, be recaptured but are
not because of rigidities existing in our system. Thus, if the building
of a factory increases the value of nearby residences (at least those
upwind) because it would substantially lessen the commuting costs of
the workers who inhabit them, one might anticipate that A could re-
capture some of that benefit through wage reductions. Even if one
were talking about a mill town, however, which might present a
somewhat homogeneous worker population, it is unlikely that A
could recapture the externalities. Rigidities introduced by minimum
wage legislation, union pay scales, and welfare legislation are only
some of the factors which might prevent A from realizing the benefits
which are theoretically available to him because he contracts with
those upon whom the benefits are bestowed. The $100,000 valuation
of A's property does not reflect this benefit. Instead, the benefit is
captured by the mill workers. For the purpose of later consideration,
we will refer to this noncaptured benefit as Re (beneficial externali-
ties caused by rigidity in the economy).
A second category of noncompensated externalities are those
[Vol, 19:3
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_urbanlaw/vol19/iss1/2
WINDFALLS, WIPEOUTS AND NUISANCE LAW
which represent incidental externalities (le). An example is increased
value for local homeowners who are not employed by A but who
could sell to those who would be, or for local business which would
sell to either A or his workers. A's inability to collect the incidental
benefits results from the failure of the law to vest A with an entitle-
ment to do so. Absent a contractual relationship, A's claim to the
value of the benefit is not legally protected.'
What then exists are two quite different calculi. From A's view-
point, the issue is one of deciding between LR and LI -DCL in which
LR is the value of his land as a residential site, LF its value as a fac-
tory site, and DCL the costs of diseconomies associated with the fac-
tory for which he is liable. In every case DCL is the lesser of (Nc +
Ac) (nuisance costs plus administration costs of their payment) or
(Pc + Ac) (prevention costs plus associated administrative costs). If
LR > LF - DCL, A develops his land as a residential site; if LR < LF
- DCL, he develops it as a factory site; if LR = LF - DCL, he is
indifferent.
From society's standpoint, that is, macro as opposed to micro, the
calculus is considerably more complex. Society's choice is between
[LR + ReR + IeR - (DCLR + DCNR)] and [LF + ReF + IeF - (DCLF
+ DCNF)I. ReR + IeR and ReF + IeF represent the noncaptured ben-
eficial externalities created by A's developing his land for residential
and factory use respectively. DCLR + DCNR and DCLF + DCNF are
the costs of diseconomies of residential and factory use for which A is
and is not liable respectively.
To A the choice is between $75,000(LR) and $100,000(LF) minus
the lesser of $30,000(Nc + Ac)65 or (Pc + Ac). If Pc + Ac >
$25,000, A develops his land for residential use. From society's posi-
tion, however, the preferred solution depends upon the magnitude of
noncaptured and nonliability externalities that are not relevant to A.
Therefore, even if Pc + Ac > $25,000, it is not clear that A's use of
his land as a residential site is most efficient. Nevertheless, under a
strict liability system, A builds a residence whenever (Pc + Ac) ex-
ceeds $25,000. The inability of the nuisance maker to capture all ex-
ternal benefits generated by his land use undercuts the comfortable
notion that by acting in his self-interest he will make the socially de-
sirable decision.
64. See generaly" E. MISHAN, supra note 15, at Il1.
65. Ac is assumed to be zero although in reality Ac is always greater than zero
and might often be considerable.
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The problem of uncompensated beneficial externalities likewise
arises in calculating prevention costs. If in our initial hypothesis B
were willing to forego the beauty and pleasure of his garden for
$20,000, then A would build his factory, buy out (or condemn) B's
garden for $20,000, and maximize his land's value at $80,000
($100,000 - $20,000). Even if we assume zero Re, Ie, and DCN, that
result is efficient only if the destruction of B's garden did not itself
create diseconomies by destroying benefits that the garden generated
but for which B was not compensated. Assume, for example, that the
serenity of B's garden increased the value of adjacent lands by
$15,000. In that case the social measure of prevention costs is
$35,000, not the $20,000 that B demands or is awarded as damages.
If ReF, IeF, and DcN were zero, A's land is most efficiently used as a
residence. Again, in a strict liability system A makes an inefficient
decision because the measure of damages reflects understated preven-
tion costs.
Although it is clear why Re's, Ie's, and DCN's exist, the reason
should be emphasized. Simply stated, if transaction costs were zero,
the amounts externalized would be accounted for in every transac-
tion. For example, returning to our hypothesis, B would correctly
measure prevention costs because the adjacent land owners would
offer him a $15,000 "bribe"66 to continue his garden. He would in-
clude that amount in the costs of discontinuing his gardening. Ad-
ministration costs, however, are never zero and, if the effects of the
garden are diffuse, the costs to adjacent landowners of determining
and assessing the amount of the bribe might well exceed the benefits
of the garden. Thus, as one relaxes the assumption of zero adminis-
tration costs, the assumption that A's cost-benefit analysis mirrors so-
ciety's becomes untenable.
The central premise of Thompson's strict liability system, that A
will necessarily act efficiently when maximizing his wealth, is errone-
ous. Efficiency results only if 1) A and B (and all other parties) are
permitted to capture all benefits and are liable for all externalities or
2) a third party decision-maker capable of social calculus is substi-
tuted for A.67 Pressing the latter point, we must ask: Does the best
66. The term bribe is used non-pejoratively to refer to the amount one will pay
another to secure an advantage to which he is not initially entitled. See generally
Coase, supra note 4.
67. If A is asked to engage in cost-benefit analysis from a social viewpoint, he
would, of course, be acting as a third-party decision maker.
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user rule employ such a decision-maker? A court using the best user
rule can consider externalities in deciding the appropriate remedy.
The best user approach, in fact, dictates a social calculus which in-
cludes consideration of beneficial externalities and nonliability dis-
economies. In that respect, it is superior to the strict liability rule.
While the best user rule dictates a social calculus, it does not neces-
sarily insure that the balancing is accurate. One must ask whether
the courts are competent decision-makers. The ability of courts to
decree efficient results is hampered, if not defeated, by the difficulties
they face in attempting to obtain the necessary data. Returning to
our hypothesis, A and B will each be represented at the proceedings
and can be expected to present information favorable to their respec-
tive positions. Furthermore, liberal discovery rules generally will en-
able each to obtain information in the possession of his opponent.
Neither party, however, is in a particularly advantageous position to
evaluate the externalities favorable to his position (such as beneficial
externalities created by their use, diseconomies created by others).
It is tempting to suggest that those who benefit but pay no compen-
sation would intervene to explain their positions. The suggestion,
however, seems unrealistic First, the impact of incidental benefits
may be so diffuse as to be inseparable, and thus not recognized as
distinct from other influences on the value of the benefited party's
land, Second, even if recognized, the benefit may be so insignificant,
as compared to the costs of intervention, as to prevent the benefited
party from going forward. Third, even if the benefits'are significant,
intervention is apt to be forestalled by the free rider problem. Fi-
nally, the costs of intervention in judicial resources may foreclose the
opportunity to intervene.6" All of these make it unlikely that the
court will obtain the data necessary to render an efficient decision.
The identity of the decision-maker-be it judge or juror- also de-
creases the likelihood that a decision will be the most efficient. Un-
like the strict liability system, the decision-maker does not make
decisions that affect him directly. Instead, he attempts to decide what
ought to be the result. He attempts to achieve a balancing of interests
that is appropriate from a societal rather than a personal standpoint.
But what the court believes the correct balance to be might often re-
flect ill-considered biases. Better decisions might be reached if the
decision-maker were affected directly. Because the strict liability sys-
68. See general' Shapiro, Some Thoughts on Intervention Before Courts, Agencies
and Arbitrators, 81 HARV. L. REV. 721 (1968), for a discussion of intervention rules.
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tern does not ask or rely upon altruistic action, the system has some
appeal.
What then is the final result? The strict liability rule does not de-
pend upon unselfishness or unbiased decision-making. It does not
insure consideration of all relevant data. It relies for its vitality upon
the decision-maker excluding from consideration all data that does
not affect him regardless of its social significance. The best user ap-
proach presents the contrary situation. It dictates that the decision-
maker act unselfishly, but unrealistically assumes that he will receive
the relevant data and will act upon it from a societal viewpoint rather
than one of personal bias. In sum, neither system can guarantee effi-
cient results; neither is clearly preferable when judged by efficiency
criteria.
The dilemma so far developed can be stated thus: Are courts, op-
erating with the broad discretion afforded them by the best user sys-
tem, sufficiently bad Pigouvian decision-makers to warrant the
abandonment of that system and the adoption of an admittedly de-
fective market system under the rubric of strict liability? Is the cost
of market failure greater or less than the cost of nonmarket failure?69
The answer is a somewhat unsatisfyng "no one knows." Selection of
either system entails a gamble that the decision-maker must take. He
cannot submit it to a market test. The litmus test is only a personal
decision of whether the chosen system produces "good" results.
V. NUISANCE LAW AND THE OMNIBUS PROPOSAL FOR A
WINDFALLS FOR WIPEOUTS SYSTEM
One subject that receives little consideration from Thompson or
Hagman and Misczynski is the role that nuisance law plays in the
omnibus proposal for a windfalls for wipeouts system. To be sure,
recoveries of nuisance damages are considered by Hagman and Mis-
czynski in the omnibus proposal. There they define a wipeout as
"any decrease in the value of property, less . . . [d]amage
[playments."7° They define damage payments to include amounts re-
ceived in nuisance actions." The interfacing of the omnibus propo-
sal and Thompson's SL/RD nuisance system, however, is odd.
69. See Wolf, A Theory of Nonmarket Failure: Framework for Implementalion
Analysis, 22 J. LAW & ECON. 107 (1979).
70. WFW, supra note 1, at 44.
71. Id
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In the omnibus proposal an individual who suffers a wipeout re-
ceives a mitigation payment of approximately fifty percent (actually
somewhere between thirty percent and seventy percent).72 Under
Thompson's proposal, on the other hand, a wiped out landowner re-
covers one hundred percent-less litigation expenses-of the de-
crease in the value of his land, and zero percent of the decrease in the
value of buildings.73 (Presumably the latter would qualify for a miti-
gation payment.) Likewise, if a nuisance maker benefits from creat-
ing a diseconomy, that betterment is a windfall to him. Yet one who
receives a nuisance windfall must repay it all plus admilistration
costs, whereas ordinarily one is entitled to keep fifty percent of any
windfall.
Neither Thompson nor Hagman/Misczynski offers any explana-
tion for distinguishing between nuisances and other forms of wind-
falls and wipeouts. If all nuisances were intentional, the surcharge on
nuisance makers might be thought of as a deterrent against unneces-
sary wipeouts. Nuisances, however, can result from negligent behav-
ior, and even those which are intentional need be so only in the sense
that one could foresee with reasonable certainty that one's land use
will affect another's interest in the private use and enjoyment of
land.74 One need not intend harm for the nuisance to be "inten-
tional." It is not so clear that the distinction can be justified in terms
of deterring undesirable behavior.
The distinction between recovery for wipeouts caused by nuisance
and other wipeouts is even more difficult to understand. If one is
wiped out, one is wiped out. It is unlikely that one is particularly
offended if it results from a nuisance as opposed to a governmental
plan. Why then does one recover more if the wipeout is caused by a
physical invasion of the type denominated by Thompson to be a nui-
sance? No explanation is offered.
Hagman and Misczynski are also at odds with Thompson in choos-
ing the appropriate basis for determining mitigation payments.
Thompson permits a successful plaintiff to recover only damages to
the value of his land.75 Denying a plaintiff recovery for the decline in
the value of his buildings is, according to Thompson, vital in prompt-
72. Id at 48.
73. Id at 195.
74. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 8A, 825 (1979). See also RESTATE-
MENT (SECOND) OF TORTS Comment e (1979).
75. WFW, supra note 1, at 195.
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ing him to make the most efficient use of his land. Is the same rea-
soning not applicable to wipeouts resulting from other causes?
Apparently, the answer is no. Hagman and Misczynski reject a "raw
land" definition of property for either the "improved land" or "real
estate" definition.76 (They do not decide between the two.) Once
again nuisance wipeouts are treated differently for no discernible rea-
son.
The reason for the failure of Hagman and Misczynski and Thomp-
son to coordinate the omnibus proposal and the SL/RD proposal
might be that for Hagman and Misczynski nuisance law represents a
minor component of a very large problem. Moreover, it is a compo-
nent with which the courts have wrestled for nearly a thousand years.
Hagman and Misczynski clearly intend to offer Thompson's analysis
primarily as a proposal to improve that mitigation technique. That,
however, does not explain fundamental differences such as the per-
centage of payment or basis of calculating damages.
VI. CONCLUSION
Like most of the recent nuisance literature, Thompson's analysis
raises perplexing questions that cannot be answered by talismatic in-
vocation of "right" and "wrong." The dilemma is as old as the issue
of welfare economics itself. Those diseconomies that lawyers speak
of as nuisances are inevitable byproducts of conflicting land uses that
cannot be "corrected" without consideration of both the efficiency
and the equity effects of the law. Thompson's proposal is an interest-
ing sketch of how we might deal with nuisances. He admits his rec-
ommendations are tentative and formulated on the basis of
"guesstimates."" His analysis should not be rejected for that reason.
Although flawed by erroneous assumptions, SL/RD may nonetheless
be a better system of nuisance law. Whether that is so requires fur-
ther analysis.
From an overall perspective, neither Thompson nor Hagman and
Misczynski has fully considered the role of nuisance law as part of
the windfalls for wipeouts proposals. That loose end is understanda-
ble given the magnitude of Hagman's and Misczynski's undertaking.
It is disturbing, however, because it suggests that WFWis itself but a
rough sketch of an approach to resolving the problem of land use
76. Id. at 32-35.
77. Id at 201-02.
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externalities. An enormous amount of detailed work obviously re-
mains; neither the omnibus nor controls format of WFWis ready for
enactment. In supplying the detail, however, we may find ourselves
faced with problems of theory and implementation not readily appar-
ent from the overall view. Upon reflection one is left with the disqui-
eting question of whether in WFW Hagman and Misczynski have
shown us the long sought after Northwest Passage or merely Alice's
rabbit hole.
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